


REDESIGNING HEALTH CARE FROM THE BOTTOM UP INSTEAD OF FROM THE TOP DOWN How Physicians Can be a Disruptive Force for Better Care and Lower Spending

Harold D. Miller
President and CEO
Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform

www.CHQPR.org




Healthcare Spending is the Biggest Driver of Federal Deficit





Premiums Have Increased 73% More Than Inflation Since 2002




Source:

Medical




Premiums Have Grown Faster Than Worker Earnings



Source:
Medical
Expenditure
Panel Survey &
Bureau of
Labor Statistics




Family Premiums Now Equal to One-Third of Worker Pay



Source:
Medical
Expenditure
Panel Survey &
Bureau of
Labor Statistics




How Do You Control Growing Healthcare Spending?






Typical Strategy #1: Cut Provider Fees for Services






Typical Strategy #2: Shift Costs to Patients





Typical Strategy #3: Delay or Deny Care to Patients





Win-Lose Results of Typical Strategies

- Patients don't get the care they need and costs increase in the future
- Small physician practices and hospitals are forced out of business
- Health insurance premiums continue to rise and access to insurance coverage decreases




Win-Lose Results of Typical Strategies

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
IS THERE A BETTER WAY?




The Right Focus: Spending That is *Unnecessary* or *Avoidable*
























Institute of Medicine Estimate: 30% of Spending is Avoidable

FRAUD



Excess Cost Domain Estimates: Lower bound totals from workshop discussions* **UNNECESSARY SERVICES** Total excess = \$210 B* Overuse: services beyond evidence-established levels · Discretionary use beyond benchmarks Defensive medicine · Unnecessary choice of higher cost services INEFFICIENTLY DELIVERED SERVICES Total excess = \$130 B* Mistakes—medical errors, preventable complications Care fragmentation Unnecessary use of higher cost providers Operational inefficiencies at care delivery sites - Physician offices - Hospitals **EXCESS ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS** Total excess = \$190 B* · Insurance-related administrative costs beyond benchmarks - Physician offices - Hospitals - Other providers Insurer administrative inefficiencies Care documentation requirement inefficiencies PRICES THAT ARE TOO HIGH Total excess = \$105 B* · Service prices beyond competitive benchmarks - Physician services i. Specialists ii. Generalists - Hospital services Product prices beyond competitive benchmarks - Pharmaceuticals - Medical devices - Durable medical equipment MISSED PREVENTION OPPORTUNITIES Total excess = \$55 B* Primary prevention Secondary prevention · Tertiary prevention


Total excess = \$75 B*

*Lower bound totals of various estimates, adjusted to 2009 total expenditure level.

All sources—payer, clinician, patient




The Right Goal: Less Avoidable \$,






The Right Goal: Less Avoidable \$, More Necessary \$






Win-Win for Patients & Payers






Barriers in the Payment System Create a Win-Lose for Providers





Barrier #1: No \$ or Inadequate \$ for High-Value Services




No Payment or Inadequate Payment for:

- Services delivered outside of face-to-face visits with clinicians, e.g., phone calls, e-mails, etc.
- Services delivered by non-clinicians, e.g., nurses, community health workers, etc.
- Communication between physicians to ensure accurate diagnosis & coordinate care
- Non-medical services, e.g., transportation
- Palliative care for patients at end of life




Barrier #2: Avoidable Spending May Be Revenue for Providers...






...And When Avoidable Services Aren't Delivered...






...Providers' Revenue May Decrease...






...But Fixed Costs Don't Vanish






...But Fixed Costs Don't Vanish and New Costs May Be Added...






...Leaving Providers With Losses (or Bigger Losses Than Today)





A Payment Change isn't Reform Unless It Removes the Barriers


BARRIER #1




No Payment or Inadequate Payment for:


- Services delivered outside of face-to-face visits with clinicians, e.g., phone calls, e-mails, etc.
- Services delivered by non-clinicians, e.g., nurses, community health workers, etc.
- Communication between physicians to ensure accurate diagnosis & coordinate care
- Non-medical services, e.g., transportation
- Palliative care for patients at end of life

BARRIER #2




So Why Haven't We Fixed This??






In Healthcare,
Payers Are From Mars,
Providers Are From Venus

Provider Approach: Pay Us More...




Provider Approach: Pay Us More... ...and "Trust Us" on Savings





Payer Concern: No *Accountability* to Reduce Avoidable Spending





Example: Accreditation Programs


 Physician practices and health systems want to be paid more if they are certified as delivering care the right way by an accrediting agency



Does Accreditation Assure High-Value Care?


- Thanks to Joint Commission hospital accreditation, there are no longer any infections or patient safety problems in hospitals
- Thanks to the Certification Commission for Health Information Technology (CCHIT), every EHR works effectively to support good patient care
- Thanks to college accreditation organizations, every parent who sends their child to college knows they will get a good education and a good job after graduation

"NOT"



In Healthcare,
Payers Are From Mars,
Providers Are From Venus

Payer Approach: "Value-Based" Pay for Performance





How Do You Define Value?



How Do You Define Value?

$$VALUE = \frac{QUALITY}{COST}$$



Which Oncologist Would You Use to Treat Your Cancer?

$$VALUE = \frac{QUALITY}{COST}$$

ONCOLOGIST #1

7 Year Survival \$5,000/patient

ONCOLOGIST #2

10 Year Survival \$10,000/patient



Oncologist #2 Rates Worse on the Standard Measure of "Value"

$$VALUE = \frac{QUALITY}{COST}$$

ONCOLOGIST #1

ONCOLOGIST #2

> 0.37 > days of life per dollar



Multiple Aspects of "Value"

$$VALUE = \frac{QUALITY}{COST}$$

ONCOLOGIST #1

8 Year Survival 20% Grade 3+ Toxicity

\$11,000/patient



ONCOLOGIST #2


10 Year Survival 50% Grade 3+ Toxicity

\$10,000/patient






Assessing Value is a Lot Harder Than This







Do Physicians Need "Incentives" or True Solutions to FFS Barriers?



Payer Approach: Save Us Money...




Payer Approach: Save Us Money & (Maybe) We'll Pay More Next Year





Provider Concern: Shared Savings is Too Little, Too Late





Medicare's Shared Savings ACO Program Isn't Succeeding

2013 Results for Medicare Shared Savings ACOs

- 46% of ACOs (102/220) increased Medicare spending
- Only 24% (52/220) received shared savings payments
- After making shared savings payments, Medicare spent more than it saved
- Net loss to Medicare: \$78 million

2014 Results for Medicare Shared Savings ACOs

- 45% of ACOs (152/333) increased Medicare spending
- Only 26% (86/333) received shared savings payments
- After making shared savings payments, Medicare spent more than it saved
- Net loss to Medicare: \$50 million

2015 Results for Medicare Shared Savings ACOs

- 48% of ACOs (189/392) increased Medicare spending
- Only 30% (119/392) received shared savings payments
- After making shared savings payments, Medicare spent more than it saved
- Net loss to Medicare: \$216 million



Private Shared Savings ACOs Are Also Floundering



Many private-payer ACOs fail to yield lower costs, better quality

By Bob Herman | October 15, 2015

CHICAGO—Medicare's investment in accountable care organizations has inspired hospitals and doctors to create their own versions of ACOs with private insurers. But as with Medicare, not all private ACOs are achieving lower costs and higher quality.


Providers and insurers need to do a better job of reaching patients and employers, according to physician executives at four large health insurance companies. They gave their take on the private ACO movement at an event held by America's Health Insurance Plans, the industry's trade group.

Their experiences reflect that ACOs are still a new structure, and building a new payment and care model as complex as an ACO is not easy to roll out.

"Our alternative payment models are succeeding at a much lower rate than they should be," said Dr. Stephen Ondra, chief medical officer at Health Care Service Corp., the Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurer for five states. "In the ACO, the consumer engagement is very, very low."




Why Aren't ACOs Succeeding?







No Change in the Way Physicians or Hospitals Are Paid



Providers Still Face All the Barriers in the Current Payment System...




...With Only the Potential for Receiving Future "Shared Savings"






ACOs Try to "Coordinate Care" Without Fixing Payment Barriers




Possibility of Future Bonuses Doesn't Overcome Current Barriers





Creating More "Risk" Won't Solve the Problems with Payment Either





Value-Based Payment Is Being Designed the *Wrong* Way Today



Value-Based Payment Is Being Designed the *Wrong* Way Today

TOP-DOWN PAYMENT REFORM


Medicare and Health Plans Define Payment Systems






Value-Based Payment Is Being Designed the *Wrong* Way Today

TOP-DOWN PAYMENT REFORM





Physicians Need to Design Payments to Support Good Care




BOTTOM-UP PAYMENT REFORM

Physicians
Redesign
Care
and Identify
Payment
Barriers



Physicians Need to Design Payments to Support Good Care



BOTTOM-UP PAYMENT REFORM


Payers
Change
Payment to
Support
Redesigned
Care



Physicians
Redesign
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and Identify
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Barriers



Physicians Need to Design Payments to Support Good Care



CHOPR CHIT DA RIGHE AND QUELT AND PROMPT BROWN


Step #1:

Identify Avoidable Spending in FFS

FEE FOR SERVICE OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE TOTAL SPENDING Avoidable Hospital Admissions/Readmissions Unnecessary Tests and Procedures AVOIDABLE Use of Lower-Cost Settings SPENDING Use of Lower-Cost Treatments Preventable Complications of Treatment Prevention & Early Identification of Disease **NECESSARY SPENDING**




Most Specialties Have Identified Areas of Avoidable Spending





Step #2: Identify Barriers in FFS




BARRIERS IN CURRENT FFS SYSTEM

- No payment for high-value services
 - Phone calls, e-mails with physicians
 - Services delivered by nurses, community workers
 - Communication/coordination among physicians
 - Non-medical services, e.g., transportation
 Palliative care for patients at end of life
- Inadequate payment for patients who need more time or résources
- Inadequate revenue to cover fixed costs when utilization of services is reduced




You Can't Reduce Spending if You Don't Remove the Barriers






Step #3: Remove the FFS Barriers






Step 4: Build in Accountability for Results






True Alternative Payment Models Can Be Win-Win-Wins






Most Healthcare Spending Doesn't Go to Physicians






But Individual Physicians Can't Control All Avoidable Spending






APM Design Must Focus on What Physician *Can* Control





Multiple APMs Needed for Different Opportunities & Barriers

www.PaymentReform.org



APM #1: Payment for a High-Value Service

APM #2: Condition-Based Payment for a Physician's Services

APM #3: Multi-Physician Bundled Payment

APM #4: Physician-Facility Procedure Bundle

APM #5: Warrantied Payment for Physician


Services

APM #6: Episode Payment for a Procedure

APM #7: Condition-Based Payment




Option 1: Add New Payment(s) to Overcome Current Barriers






Option 1, Part 2: Add in an Accountability Component






Accountability Component Could Utilize a P4P Approach






Option 2: Bundle New Payment with Existing Payments






Option 2, Part 2: Add an Accountability Component






Option 3: Full Bundle Covering Necessary & Avoidable Costs






If Patients Differ in the Services They Need...






...Or if Patients Differ in Risks & Opportunities for Better Care






APM \$ Will Have to Be Adjusted for Differences in Need



Accountability Targets Need to Be Adjusted for Patient Differences




How Does All of This Apply to Oncology?




Cancer Care is a Big Part of Healthcare Spending








Spending on Cancer Care Has Grown Rapidly






Where Does Spending on Medical Oncology Go?





<10% of Spending Pays Oncology Practices for Services






Half of the Spending Goes to Drugs






8% of Spending Goes to Laboratory Tests and Imaging






20% Goes to Radiation Therapy, Procedures, and Other Services







11% of Spending is for ED Visits & Hospital Admissions




Most \$\$ Go to Drugs, Tests, and Admissions, *Not* Oncology Practices



Most \$\$ Go to Drugs, Tests, and Admissions, *Not* Oncology Practices



Opportunity 1: Reducing Avoidable ED Visits and Hospitalizations





Large Reductions in Avoidable ED Visits & Hospitalizations

How We Do It

Oncology patient-centered medical home and accountable cancer care

John D. Sprandio, MD

Consultants in Medical Oncology and Hematology, PC, Drexel Hill, PA

With the passage of healthcare reform and the call for improved quality, value, and demonstration of results, the primary care posites-centered medical home (PCAM) concept has gained considerable traction across the United States. In 2004, we began reengineering our processes of concert care delivery in our medical ancology practice concurrently with the implementation of an octology-specific electronic medical record and the development of customized software to better suit practice/potent needs and to facilitate data collection. These custom software applications were designed to support comprehensive processes of care that were also required for level III medical home recognition by the National Committee for Caulity Assurance (NCQA). We have been tracking our data for the past 5 years, documenting improvements in disease management—notably the reduction in emergency room utilization and hospital admissions. We have engaged local and national payers with the goal of developing collaborative pilot programs. Furthermore, we are establishing formalized relationships with other like-minded medical encology and primary care PCAMI practices, as we continue to refine our delivery of cancer care within an encology PCAMI model.

edical oncologists are playing an ever-expanding role in the delivery of cancer care. The current and future challenges they face in their efforts to deliver effective, efficient, and appropriate cancer care are broad, and solutions to the rising costs of cancer care continue to be sought. The patient-centered medical home (PCMH) model has emerged as a partial solution to the fragmented delivery of primary healthcare. In many instances, the delivery of cancer care is also fragmented-fraught with deficiencies in communication, coordination, and accountability. The oncology PCMH (OPCMH) model of cancer care may potentially serve as a practice framework for oncologists. The OPCMH model attempts promote a value-based agenda that facilitates physician accountability, encourage clinical integration between like-minded medical oncology groups, enhance communication and coordination of care with primary care PCMH models, and collaborate with payers while maintaining a focus on patient needs and evidence-based

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Volume 7/Number 12

A backward glance at the PCMH model

A combination of factors has led to the rapid acceptance of the PCMH model in the delivery of primary care: (1) physician and patient recognition of the PCMH model as a partial solution to the unacceptable fragmentation of healthcare delivery; (2) the availability of electronic medical records (EMRs) and the actionable information that can be mined from clinical databases; (3) the alignment of incentives among stakeholders, including the largest employers in the United States, medical professional societies, consumers, insurance companies, academic institutions, patient advocacy groups, state Medicaid agencies, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; and (4) early results from medical home demonstration projects, suggesting that elements of the model may have a positive effect on quality, cost, and satisfaction of the patient and clinical team. 1,2

Unacceptable fragmentation of care

In order to address the fragmentation of care, there are a number of actions that physicians should take:

care for patients across the continuum, improve the coordination of care, establish a standardized comprehensive process of care, adhere to established practice guidelines, utilize a care-team approach, engage and educate patients to enhance involvement in their care, and create innovative ways of communicating with all partial interval.

EMR systems

When fully implemented and enhanced, EMR systems have the potential by promote a culture of continuous improvement that creates practice efficiencies. Furthermore, EMRs can potentially allow physicians to concertrate on their primary responsibilities of making complex medical decisions based on real time, evidence-based data while establishing and maintaining personal relationships with their

Manuscript received November 16, 2010; accepted December 3, 2010.

Correspondence to: John D. Sprandio, MD, Consultants in Medical Oncology and Hematology, PC, 2100 Keystone Avenue, Suite 502, MOB, Drezel Hill, PA 19026; telephone 610-622-3818; fax: 610-622-6407; e-mail: jsprandio

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December 2010 ■ COMMUNITY ONCOLOGY 565




FIGURE 3 Average emergency room (ER) evaluations at Delaware County Memorial Hospital of the Drexel Hill office population per chemotherapy patient per year, 2004–2010 (YTD).



Better Care and Lower Spending Possible For End-of-Life Patients

MEDICARE INNOVATION

By Erin Murphy Colligan, Erin Ewald, Sarah Ruiz, Michelle Spafford, Caitlin Cross-Barnet, and

Innovative Oncology Care Models Improve End-Of-Life Quality, **Reduce Utilization And Spending**

ABSTRACT Three models that received Health Care Innovation Awards from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) aimed to reduce the cost and use of health care services and improve the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries with cancer. Each emphasized a different principle: the oncology medical home, patient navigation, or palliative care. Comparing participants in each model who died during the study period to matched comparators, we found that the oncology medical home and patient navigation models were associated with decreased costs in the last ninety days of life (\$3,346 and \$5,824 per person, respectively) and fewer hospitalizations in the last thirty days of life (fifty-seven and forty per 1,000 people, respectively). The patient navigation model was also associated with fewer emergency department visits in the last thirty days of life and increased hospice enrollment in the last two weeks of life. These promising results can inform new initiatives for cancer patients, such as the CMS Oncology Care Model.

edicare expenditures in the last year of life for beneficiaries with cancer range from \$56,784 for those with melanoma to \$140,891 for those with brain cancer. These far exceed the average \$38,975 per beneficiary Medicare spending in the last year of life.1,2 There were approximately 901,000 Medicare beneficiaries with cancer in expected to increase to 1.2 million in 2020.1 Total costs of cancer care in the last year of life amounted to \$37 million in 2010 and will approach \$50 million in 2020.3 Much end-of-life spending results from high rates of hospitalizations, emergency department (ED) visits, and stays in the intensive care unit in patients' last months.45 A substantial proportion of hospitalizations and ED visits at the end of life are avoidable and thus represent an area for improved reduced utilization.6

High utilization of cancer treatment at the end of life not only poses a burden to the health care system, but it also may represent poor outcomes from the perspective of patients. Previous studies suggest that patients with advanced cancer prefer to have less aggressive treatment and more spiritual support and palliative care, and to avoid intensive inpatient settings at the end of life.10,11 In fact, the National Quality Forum has the last year of life in 2010, and that number is recognized the need to emphasize the importance of palliative options for cancer care at the end of life. It has endorsed the use of several measures as indicators of poor quality of care at the end of life, such as the use of chemotherapy in the last fourteen days of life, multiple ED visits and stays in the intensive care unit in the last thirty days of life, and enrollment in hospice for fewer than three days.12

Though hospice is designed to facilitate patients' end-of-life preferences, keeping patients quality of care and patient satisfaction and for at home or in a nondinical environment while reducing pain and psychological stress and pro-

DOL: 10.1377/hithaff 2016 13.03 HEALTH AFFAIRS 36 o2017 Project HOPE-The People to People Health

Erin Murphy Colligan is a analyst at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, in Baltimore, Maryland.


Frin Ewald is a research scientist at NORC at the University of Chicago in Bethesda, Maryland

scientist at the National Institute on Disability, Independent Living, and Rehabilitation Research, in Washington, D.C. This work was completed while she was a senior research scientist at NORC at the University of Chicago.


Michelle Spafford (spaffordmichelle@norc.org) is a research scientist at NORC at the University of Chicago

analyst at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid

principal health economist at NORC at the University of



13-16% Lower **Spending**



Hospitalizations ED visits


COME HOME

Hospitalizations ED visits


PCCP



No Payment For Services Needed to Improve Outcomes of Care



Opportunity 2: Reducing Avoidable Use of Drugs, Tests, & Imaging





ASCO Choosing Wisely List Targets Areas of High Spending



American Society of Clinical Oncology



Five Things Physicians and Patients Should Question

The American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) is a medical professional oncology society committed to conquering cancer through research, education, preventi and delivery of high-quality patient care. ASCO recognizes the importance of evidence-based cancer care and making wise choices in the diagnosis and management of patients with cancer. After careful consideration by experienced oncologists, ASCO highlights five categories of tests, procedures and/or treatments whose commo use and clinical value are not supported by available evidence. These test and treatment options should not be administered unless the physician and patient have carefully considered if their use is appropriate in the individual case. As an example, when a patient is enrolled in a clinical trial, these tests, treatments, and procedure may be part of the trial protocol and therefore deemed necessary for the patient's participation in the trial.



Don't use cancer-directed therapy for solid tumor patients with the following characteristics: low performance status (3 or 4), no benefit from prior evidence-based interventions, not eligible for a clinical trial, and no strong evidence supporting the clinical value of further anti-

- · Studies show that cancer directed treatments are likely to be ineffective for solid tumor patients who meet the above stated criteria.
- · Exceptions include patients with functional limitations due to other conditions resulting in a low performance status or those with disease characteristics (e.g., mutations) that suggest a high likelihood of response to therapy.
- · Implementation of this approach should be accompanied with appropriate palliative and supportive care.



Don't perform PET, CT, and radionuclide bone scans in the staging of early prostate cancer at low risk for metastasis.

- Imaging with PET, CT, or radionuclide bone scans can be useful in the staging of specific cancer types. However, these tests are often used in the staging evaluation of low-risk cancers, despite a lack of evidence suggesting they improve detection of metastatic disease or survival.
- · Evidence does not support the use of these scans for staging of newly diagnosed low grade carcinoma of the prostate (Stage T1c/T2a, prostate-specific antigen (PSA) <10 ng/ml, Gleason score less than or equal to 6) with low risk of distant metastasis.
- Unnecessary imaging can lead to harm through unnecessary invasive procedures, over-treatment, unnecessary radiation exposure, and misdiagnosis.

- Don't perform PET, CT, and radionuclide bone scans in the staging of early breast cancer at low risk for metastasis.
- . Imaging with PET, CT, or radionuclide bone scans can be useful in the staging of specific cancer types. However, these tests are often used in the staging evaluation of low-risk cancers, despite a lack of evidence suggesting they improve detection of metastatic disease or survival.
- . In breast cancer, for example, there is a lack of evidence demonstrating a benefit for the use of PET, CT, or radionuclide bone scans in asymptomatic individuals with newly identified ductal carcinoma in situ (DCIS), or clinical stage I or II disease.
- Unnecessary imaging can lead to harm through unnecessary invasive procedures, over-treatment, unnecessary radiation exposure, and misdiagnosis.

Don't perform surveillance testing (biomarkers) or imaging (PET, CT, and radionuclide bone scans) for asymptomatic individuals who have been treated for breast cancer with

- · Surveillance testing with serum tumor markers or imaging has been shown to have clinical value for certain cancers (e.g., colorectal). However for breast cancer that has been treated with curative intent, several studies have shown there is no benefit from routine imaging or serial measurement of serum
- False-positive tests can lead to harm through unnecessary invasive procedures, over-treatment, unnecessary radiation exposure, and misdiagnosis.

Don't use white cell stimulating factors for primary prevention of febrile neutropenia for patients with less than 20 percent risk for this complication.

- · ASCO guidelines recommend using white cell stimulating factors when the risk of febrile neutropenia, secondary to a recommended chemotherapy regimen, is approximately 20 percent and equally effective treatment programs that do not require white cell stimulating factors are unavailable
- Exceptions should be made when using regimens that have a lower chance of causing febrile neutropenia if it is determined that the patient is at high risk for this complication (due to age, medical history, or disease characteristics).



22%-47% Non-Adherence to Choosing Wisely Criteria

Rate of Non-Adherence to Choosing Wisely Guidelines

Focus on Quality

Original Contribution

Baseline Estimates of Adherence to American Society of Clinical Oncology/American Board of Internal Medicine **Choosing Wisely Initiative Among Patients With Cancer Enrolled With a Large Regional Commercial Health Insurer**

By Scott D. Ramsey, MD, PhD, Catherine Fedorenko, MMSci, Rakesh Chauhan, MD, Richard McGee, MD, Gary H. Lyman, MD, MPH, Karma Kreizenbeck, BA, and Aasthaa Bansal, PhD

Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center; University of Washington; and Premera Blue Cross, Seattle, WA

See accompanying article on page 344

Abstract

Purpose: The American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO)/ American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) Choosing Wisely (CW) measures aim to reduce the use of interventions that lack evidence of bonefit in cancer care. The study presented here characterized adherence to the 2012 ASCO/ABIM CW recommendations by linking health plan claims data with a regional cancer registry and sought to identify areas for research interventions to improve adherence.

Methods: SEER records for patients diagnosed with cancer in Western Washington State between 2007 and 2014 were linked with enrollment and claims from a large regional commercial insurance plan. Using claims and SEER records, algorithms were developed to characterize adherence to each CW measure. In addition, we calculated differences in total reimbursements and procedure-specific reimburse

Introduction

In April of 2012, the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) and the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) Foundation, as part of the ABIM Choosing Wisely (CW) campaign, released the initial Top Five list of tests and procedures in oncology for which use should be questioned because of their failure to add clinical value (Data Supplement).1

The CW list was designed to identify practices that are costly, widely used, and for which no evidence exists to support value, and to promote conversations between physicians and patients about using the most appropriate tests and treatments as well as about avoiding care that is unnecessary or for which harm may outweigh the benefits.

Although the CW list was selected after input from more than 200 oncologists, there was no empiric validation of either the prevalence of the care processes that were included, their costs to the health care system, or the accuracy of measurement of these processes in oncology practice. Because these are important issues for health care delivery systems, we used cancer egistry and health insurance claims data to test the importance of the practices that were included on the CW list, to retrospec tively review oncologists' adherence to these practices, and to

ments for patients receiving adherent and nonadherent Results: A total of 22,359 unique individuals with cancer were linked with insurance enrollment records and met basic eligibility

criteria. Overall achierence varied from 53% (breast surveillance) to stantially by stage at diagnosis and by cancer site in situations in which the CW measure affected multiple types of cancer. The dif-ference in reimbursements between adherent and nonadherent populations across all five measures was approximately \$29 million

Conclusion: Adherence to the ASCO/ABIM CW measures varies widely as does the cost implication of nonadherence. A structured approach to evaluating adherence and cost impact is needed before developing programs aimed at improving adherence to the ASCO/ABIM CW measures.

test the feasibility of using administrative data to measure adherence. These are issues of relevance to health care delivery systems and health insurers, given that implementation of the CW recommendations will require substantial investments on

Accordingly, the primary purpose of this study was to estimate adherence to the ASCO/ABIM recommendations in persons with cancer who are enrolled in a large regional commercial insurance plan. To further evaluate the relative level of cost savings that might be achieved through improving adherence to the measures, we also estimated total health care costs for persons whose care was adherent to CW recommer dations versus costs for those with similar characteristics who had nonadherent care. Our findings may be helpful to health care organizations that are considering investment in measures and processes that are designed to improve adherence to the CW recommendations for oncology.

Setting and Study Population


The study was conducted by Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center investigators in conjunction with leaders at Premera

Do not use white-cell stimulating factors for patients undergoing chemotherapy with less than 20% risk of febrile... Do not use PET, CT and radionuclide bone scans in staging early prostate cancer at low risk of spreading Do not use PET, CT and radionuclide bone scans in staging early breast cancer at low

risk of spreading

benefit


Do not use routine biomarker tests and



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
27%-40% Non-Adherence to Choosing Wisely Criteria






30% of Patients Are Receiving CSFs Outside of Guidelines











Neulasta is the #3 Part B Drug: \$1.2 Billion in Medicare Spending




CMS Spends More on Pegfilgrastim Than on Patient Visits w/ Oncologists






14% of Drug Spend & 7% of Total During Chemo is Pegfilgrastim







Elimination of 30% Overuse Reduces Total Drug Spend by 4%



Inadequate Resources for Effective Planning & Monitoring of Care




Inadequate Resources for Effective Planning & Monitoring of Care





17% of Drug Spend & 8% of Total Spending is Bevacizumab





Alternative Regimens Have Similar Efficacy But Much Lower Cost


First Line Regimens for Metastatic Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer	
(non-squamous histology, no EGFR or ALK mutation pre	esent)

Regimen	Median Overall Survival (months)	Median Progression- Free Survival	Grade 3+ Adverse Event	Cost Difference (6 cycles)
Carboplatin + Paclitaxel	10.3	4.5	24%	
Carboplatin + Paclitaxel + Bevacizumab	12.3	6.3	61%	+~\$30,000
Sandler, A et al. New England Journal of Medicine 2006;355:2542-50				
Cisplatin + Gemcitabine	13.1	6.1	75%	
Cisplatin + Gemcitabine + Bevacizumab	13.6	6.7	76%	+~\$30,000

Reck, M et al. Journal of Clinical Oncology 2009; 27(8):1227-2415

Reck, M et al. Annals of Oncology 2010

Failure to Pay for Good Care... Leads to Costly, Low-Value Services



ASCO Payment Reform Developed by Oncologists & Practice Managers

- Christian Thomas, MD, New England Cancer Specialists
- Dan Zuckerman, MD, Mountain States Tumor Institute
- Tammy Chambers, Center for Cancer and Blood Disorders
- James Frame, MD, CAMC Cancer Center
- Bruce Gould, MD, Northwest Georgia Oncology Center
- Ann Kaley, Mountain States Tumor Institute
- Justin Klamerus, MD, Karmanos Cancer Institute
- Lauren Lawrence, Karmanos Cancer Institute
- Barbara McAneny, MD, New Mexico Cancer Center
- Roscoe Morton, MD, Cancer Center of Iowa
- Julie Moran, Seidman Cancer Center
- Ray Page, DO, PhD, Center for Cancer and Blood Disorders
- Scott Parker, Northwest Georgia Oncology Center
- Charles Penley, MD, Tennessee Oncology
- Gabrielle Rocque, MD, University of Alabama at Birmingham
- Barry Russo, Center for Cancer and Blood Disorders
- Joel Saltzman, MD, Seidman Cancer Center
- Laura Stevens, Innovative Oncology Business Solutions
- Jeffery Ward, MD, Swedish Cancer Institute
- Kim Woofter, Michiana Hematology Oncology
- Robin Zon, MD, Michiana Hematology Oncology

THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY

PATIENT-CENTERED ONCOLOGY PAYMENT


Payment Reform to Support Higher Quality, More Affordable Cancer Care May 2015



www.asco.org/paymentreform




PCOP Part 1: More Payment to Practices Where It's Needed






PCOP Part 2: Implement ASCO Guidelines & Avoid ED Visits






Payment Based on Adherence to Appropriate Use Criteria





PCOP Result: Better Care, Better Payment, Payer Savings





Analysis of PCOP Shows Large Net Savings from Better Payment

THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY

PATIENT-CENTERED ONCOLOGY PAYMENT

Payment Reform to Support Higher Quality, More Affordable Cancer Care May 2015



www.asco.org/paymentreform

Costs and Savings from Pa	tient-Centered	Oncology Paym	ent
	Current Average Spending Per Beneficiary	With Proposed New Payments and Estimated Savings	% Change
Month Prior to Treatment			
E&M Services	\$296	\$296	
PCOP		\$750	
During and 2 Months After Treatment			
E&M Services	\$2,071	\$2,071	
Infusion Services	\$1,904	\$1,904	
PCOP		\$1,190	
Chemotherapy/Drugs	\$25,131	\$23,372	-79
Lab Tests	\$583	\$553	-59
Imaging	\$1,503	\$1,428	-59
ED/Ambulance	\$421	\$295	-309
Inpatient	\$7,100	\$4,970	-309
Other	\$10,920	\$10,920	09
Months 3-6 After Treatment			
E&M Services	\$120	\$120	
PCOP		\$220	
Total	\$50,048	\$48,089	-3.9%

For 500 New Patients:	
Additional Practice Revenues	\$1,080,000
Net Payer Savings	\$979,802



Potentially Large Win-Win-Win for Payers, Patients & Practices

THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY

PATIENT-CENTERED ONCOLOGY PAYMENT

Payment Reform to Support Higher Quality, More Affordable Cancer Care May 2015



www.asco.org/paymentreform

	Current Average Spending Per Beneficiary	With Proposed New Payments and Estimated Savings	% Change
Ionth Prior to Treatment			
E&M Services	\$296	\$296	
PCOP		\$750	
uring and 2 Months After Treatment			
E&M Services	\$2,071	\$2,071	
Infusion Services	\$1,904	\$1,904	
PCOP		\$1,190	
Chemotherapy/Drugs	\$25,131	\$23,372	-7%
Lab Tests	\$583	\$553	-5%
Imaging	\$1,503	\$1,428	-5%
ED/Ambulance	\$421	\$295	-30%
Inpatient	\$7,100	\$4,970	-30%
Other	\$10,920	\$10,920	0%
Ionths 3-6 After Treatment			
E&M Services	\$120	\$120	
PCOP		\$220	
Total	\$50,048	\$48,089	-3.9%


For 500 New Patients:

Additional Practice Revenues \$1,080,000

Net Payer Savings \$979,802




What About the CMMI Oncology Care Model?





The Oncology Care Model Doesn't Eliminate Current FFS...


HOW ONCOLOGY PRACTICE IS PAID TODAY





It Adds New Monthly Payments...


HOW ONCOLOGY PRACTICE IS PAID IN CMMI OCM PROGRAM





It Adds New Monthly Payments... But Only If Chemotherapy is Given

HOW ONCOLOGY PRACTICE IS PAID IN CMMI OCM PROGRAM




Under OCM, the financial penalty to the oncology practice for *not* treating the patient is even higher than it is today, with no extra support for time needed for end-of-life discussions and no extra support for palliative care



OCM Then Puts Practice at Risk for *Total* Spending on Patients

HOW ONCOLOGY PRACTICE IS PAID IN CMMI OCM PROGRAM






Problems with Risk Under OCM

Performance-Based Payment (Risk-Sharing)

- Practices would receive bonuses for delivering cheaper, less effective treatments to patients and for avoiding important surveillance testing
- Practices would be penalized for treating higher-cost types of cancer and for health problems the patient has that are unrelated to cancer
- Practices that are currently overusing services could be rewarded because target spending is based on the practice's own historical costs
- Practices could be penalized for treating higher-risk patients because risk adjustment does not capture major factors affecting spending




OCM Uses an "Episode" Model to Pay for Oncology Care





OCM Uses an "Episode" Model to Pay for Oncology Care




How did CMS decide on a 6 month episode?



Monthly Spending on Cancer Patients


Figure 4.1. Average Monthly Total Medicare Payments for Beneficiaries Initiating Chemotherapy in 2010





Monthly Spending In First Six Months vs. Later


Figure 4.1. Average Monthly Total Medicare Payments for Beneficiaries Initiating Chemotherapy in 2010





Cumulative Spending By Month


Figure 4.2. Cumulative Proportion of Total 24-Month Medicare Payments Occurring in Each Month Relative to Chemotherapy Initiation






6 Month Episodes?

Figure 4.2. Cumulative Proportion of Total 24-Month Medicare Payments Occurring in Each Month Relative to Chemotherapy Initiation







What Happens If One of the Patient's Treatments is Delayed?






Logic Would Say That It's Now a Longer (7 Month) Episode








But CMMI Says It's a *New Episode* With \$960 More in Payments





And Shared Savings Is More Likely With Same Spending in 2 Episodes





Undesirable New Incentives for Oncology Practices






Incentive to Stretch Out Treatment?



Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Design of Care & Payment

CMS ONCOLOGY CARE MODEL





Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Design of Care & Payment

CMS ONCOLOGY CARE MODEL

Medicare and Health Plans Define Payment Systems

Physicians and Hospitals Have To Change Care to Align With Payment Systems

Both
Patients
and
Providers
May Lose

ASCO PATIENT-CENTERED ONCOLOGY PAYMENT

Payers
Change
Payment to
Support
Redesigned
Care


Physicians Redesign Care and Identify Payment

Barriers

Patients
Get Better
Care and
Providers
Stay
Financially
Viable




APM for Medical Oncology Could Improve Care, Lower Cost






What About Other Oncology Sub-Specialties?






Many Types of Avoidable Spending Already Identified






Opportunities to Improve Value in Surgical Oncology





Opportunities to Improve Value in Radiation Oncology






21st Century Oncology Rad Onc Bundled Payments

- Payment based on type of cancer, not based on type of radiation therapy used
- Payment based on weighted average of available therapies, with discount over past spending
- Payments adjusted as technology and evidence changes
- Warranty for repeat treatments within 90 days
- Predictable spending for payers and patients
- Predictable revenues to oncology practice to cover fixed costs of expensive equipment without the need or incentive to overuse services with high average cost/payment



Supporting Coordinated Care from All Oncology Specialties





Should Providers Fear the Risks of Alternative Payment Models?

Risks Under APMs

- Will the amount of payment be adequate to cover the services patients need?
- Will risk adjustment be adequate to control for differences in need?
- How will you control the costs of other providers involved in the care in the alternative payment model?
- What portion of payments will be withheld based on quality measures?
- Will you have enough patients to cover the costs of managing the new payment?



Risk Is Not New to Providers, It's Just *Different* Risk in APMs

Risks Under FFS

- Will fee levels from payers be adequate to cover the costs of delivering services?
- What utilization controls will payers impose on your services?
- What "value-based" reductions will be made in your payments based on "efficiency" measures?
- •What "value-based" reductions will be made in your fees based on quality measures?
- Will you have enough patients to cover your practice or hospital expenses?

Risks Under APMs

- Will the amount of payment be adequate to cover the services patients need?
- Will risk adjustment be adequate to control for differences in need?
- How will you control the costs of other providers involved in the care in the alternative payment model?
- What portion of payments will be withheld based on quality measures?
- Will you have enough patients to cover the costs of managing the new payment?



Will Payers Implement Physician-Focused Payments?






Most Health Plans Resist True Payment Reforms





For Most Workers, *Employers* are the Insurer, Not a Health Plan



For Self-Funded Employers, The Health Plan is Just a Pass Through

Purchaser Payment SelfFunded Purchasers ASO Health Plan (No Risk) Physician Practice

Provider Claims



Little Incentive for Health Plans to Support Payment Reforms

Purchaser Payment

Self-Funded Purchasers ASO Health Plan (No Risk)

Providers


Provider Claims

True Payment Reform Means:

- Health plan incurs the costs of implementing new payment models
- Purchaser gains all the savings from reduced utilization and spending (because all claims are passed through)




2nd Biggest Source of Spending Growth is Insurance Administration





25% of Avoidable Spending is Excess Administrative Costs





A Better Approach: Purchaser/Provider Partnerships



Better Payment and Benefit Structure

Lower Cost, Higher Quality Care

Providers
Willing to
Manage
Costs

Purchasers and Patients "win" if:

- Providers reduce purchasers' costs
- Patients stay healthy and have lower costsharing

Provider "wins" if:

- Patients stay healthy and need less care
- Purchaser pays provider adequately to manage care efficiently

Purchasers and Physicians Have Common Interests, But Don't Know It

"We've started talking directly to physicians, and we've discovered that what they want to sell is what we want to buy..."

Cheryl DeMars
CEO, The Alliance
(Employer Coalition in Wisconsin)



Purchasers Have Total Risk Today

TOTAL COST OF HEALTH CARE

Self-Funded Purchasers, Medicare, Medicaid

Providers




The Goal Should *Not* Be to Shift Total Risk to Physicians






Physicians Should be Accountable for Costs They Can Control






Health Plan Implements Changes Purchasers/Providers Agree On






Facilitator Needed to Provide Data and Technical Assistance



Regional Multi-Stakeholder Groups Facilitate Win-Win-Win Solutions

Regional Health Improvement Collaboratives (RHICS)






Network for Regional Healthcare Improvement www.NRHI.org



Florida Needs a Mechanism for Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration


Regional Health Improvement Collaboratives (RHICS)






Network for Regional Healthcare Improvement www.NRHI.org

There Are NOT (Just) Two Choices Under MACRA





There are 3 Paths to the Future: Which Will Oncologists Choose?







1. Continue listening to Powerpoint presentations at the FLASCO Meeting, go back home, continue business as usual, and hope somebody else figures this out



- Continue listening to Powerpoint presentations at the FLASCO Meeting, go back home, continue business as usual, and hope somebody else figures this out
- 2. Plan to retire before 2019



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



- Continue listening to Powerpoint presentations at the FLASCO Meeting, go back home, continue business as usual, and hope somebody else figures this out
- 2. Plan to retire before 2019
- 3. Design/implement physician-led APMs for oncology
 - Look at your own patient population and identify opportunities to reduce spending without harming patients
 - Talk to the purchasers in your community about the opportunities to improve care and reduce spending and how to create a collaborative regional partnership to implement them
 - Demand that health plans and Medicare implement good alternative payment models to enable you to deliver more affordable, high-quality care in your community





Learn More About Win-Win-Win Payment and Delivery Reform


www.PaymentReform.org


























For More Information:

Harold D. Miller

President and CEO
Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform

Miller.Harold@CHQPR.org (412) 803-3650

www.CHQPR.org www.PaymentReform.org

APPENDIX

Example of Win-Win-Win Approach for Physicians, Hospitals, and Payers Using Condition-Based Payment



Example: Reducing Preventable Admits During Cancer Treatment

	CURRENT				
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$		
Oncology Pract.					
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000		

Patients Receiving Chemotherapy Treatment for Cancer

- 1,000 patients treated by oncology practice in a year
- Oncology practice receives \$4,500 per patient in total fees for E&M services and infusion services (excluding cost of drugs)



Example: Reducing Preventable Admits During Cancer Treatment

	CURRENT				
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Hospitalizations					
Admissions	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000		

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- 35% of patients are hospitalized during the year for complications related to chemotherapy treatment (\$15,000 payment to hospital per admission)



Example: Reducing Preventable Admits During Cancer Treatment

1						
	CURRENT					
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$			
Oncology Pract.						
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Hospitalizations						
Admissions	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000			
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000			

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- 35% of patients are hospitalized during the year for complications related to chemotherapy treatment (\$15,000 payment to hospital per admission)

How Would You Improve Payment and Lower Total Spending?

	CURRENT		FUTURE				
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	?			
Hospitalizations							
Admissions	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000	?			
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000	?			



Improve Care for Patients By Paying for Triage/Response

	CURRENT		FUTURE				
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
					-		
Hospitalizations							
Admissions	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000				
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000				

Better Payment for Cancer Treatment Management

 Oncology practice paid additional \$200,000 (\$200/patient) to set up a triage system and provide rapid treatment in the office for complications of treatment (nausea, fever, etc.)

Reduction in Hospital Admissions Would More Than Pay for Costs

		CURRE	NT		FUTUR	E	
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
Hospitalizations							
Admissions	\$15,000	350			245	\$3,675,000	-30%
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000		1000	\$9,375,000	-14%

Better Payment for Cancer Treatment Management

- Oncology practice paid additional \$200,000 (\$200/patient) to set up a triage system and provide rapid treatment in the office for complications of treatment (nausea, fever, etc.)
- Result is a 30% reduction in preventable hospital admissions



Wins for Patients, Docs, & Payers

	CURRENT						
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4500	1000	\$4,500,000	
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Oncology Practice Wins

Patient Wins

Payer Wins

Better Payment for Cancer Treatment Management

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- Result is a 30% reduction in preventable hospital admissions



Wins for Patients, Docs, & Payers But What About Hospitals?

		CURRE	NT		FUTUR	E	
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
Hospitalizations							
Admissions	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000	\$15,000	245	\$3,675,000	-30%
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000		1000	\$9,375,000	-14%

Oncology Practice Wins

Hospital Loses

Payer Wins

Better Payment for Cancer Treatment Management


- Oncology practice paid additional \$200,000 (\$200/patient) to set up a triage system and provide rapid treatment in the office for complications of treatment (nausea, fever, etc.)
- Result is a 30% reduction in preventable hospital admissions



What Should Matter to Hospitals is *Margin*, Not Revenues (Volume)




Hospital Costs Are Not Proportional to Utilization






Reductions in Utilization Reduce Revenues More Than Costs






Causing Negative Margins for Hospitals





But Spending Can Be Reduced Without Bankrupting Hospitals





We Need to Understand the Hospital's Cost Structure

		CURRE	NT		FUTUR	E	
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4500	1000	\$4,500,000	
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Hospitalizations							
Admissions	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000	\$15,000	245	\$3,675,000	-30%
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Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
		-					
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500				
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000				
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500				
Total Hospital (\$	15,000	350	\$5,250,000				
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000				



Now, If the Number of Admissions is Reduced...

		CURRE	NT		FUTUR	E	
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500				
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000				
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500				
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350			245		
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000				



...Fixed Costs Will Remain the Same (in the Short Run)...

		CURRE	NT		FUTUR	E	
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500			\$3,412,500	0%
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000		,		
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500				
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000		245		
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000				



.. Variable Costs Will Decrease in Proportion to Admissions...

		CURRE	NT		FUTUR	E	
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500		,	\$3,412,500	0%
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000	, , , , , , , , , ,		\$1,102,500	-30%
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500		,		
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000		245		
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000				

...And Even With a Higher Margin...

		CURRE	NT		FUTUR	E	
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500			\$3,412,500	0%
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000	\$4,500		\$1,102,500	-30%
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500			\$273,000	+4%
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000		245		
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000				



...The Hospital Comes Out Ahead With Significantly Lower Revenue

						_	
		CURRE	NT		FUTUR	E	
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
	-	-			-		
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500			\$3,412,500	0%
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000	\$4,500		\$1,102,500	-30%
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500		,	\$273,000	+4%
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000			\$4,788,000	-9%
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000				



And the Payer Still Saves Money

		CURRE	NT		FUTUR	E	
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
					·		
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500			\$3,412,500	0%
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000	\$4,500		\$1,102,500	-30%
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500			\$273,000	+4%
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000		245	\$4,788,000	-9%
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000			\$9,488,000	-3%

I.e., a Win-Win-Win-Win for Patient, Practice, Hospital, & Payer

		CURRE	NT		FUTUR	E	
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
	1						
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500			\$3,412,500	0%
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000	\$4,500		\$1,102,500	-30%
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500			\$273,000	+4%
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000		245	\$4,788,000	-9%
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000		1000	\$9,488,000	-3%

Oncology Practice Wins

Hospital Wins

Payer Wins



What Payment Model Supports This Win-Win-Win Approach?

		CURRENT			FUTURE			
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg	
Oncology Pract.								
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000		
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000		
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%	
Hospitalizations								
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500			\$3,412,500	0%	
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000	\$4,500		\$1,102,500	-30%	
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500			\$273,000	+4%	
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000		245	\$4,788,000	-9%	
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000			\$9,488,000	-3%	



Trying to Renegotiate Individual Fees Is Impractical

	CURRENT						
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000	
Triage/Respond				\$200	1000	\$200,000	
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000		1000	\$4,700,000	+4%
	1	-					
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500			\$3,412,500	0%
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000	\$4,500		\$1,102,500	-30%
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500			\$273,000	+4%
Total Hospital	\$15,000			\$19,543	245	\$4,788,000	-9%
Total Spending		1000	\$9,750,000		1000	\$9,488,000	-3%



Look at What is Being Spent on the Patients' Condition

	CURRENT						
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Cho
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000				1
Triage/Respond							1
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000				
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500				
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000				
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500				
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000				
Total Spending	\$9,750	1000	\$9,750,000				

...Offer to Manage Care for a Lower, But More Flexible Payment

	CURRENT						
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg
Oncology Pract.							
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000				
Triage/Respond							
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000				
Hospitalizations							
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500				
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000				
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500				
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000				
Total Spending	\$9,750	1000		\$9,488			-3%



...Use the Payment as a Budget to Redesign Care...

		CURRENT			FUTURE			
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg	
Oncology Pract.								
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000					
Triage/Respond								
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,700	1000	\$4,700,000	+4%	
Hospitalizations								
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500				0%	
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000				-30%	
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500				+4%	
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000	\$4,788	1000	\$4,788,000	%	
Total Spending	\$9,750	1000		\$9,488		\$9,488,000	-3%	

...And Let Physicians and Hospitals Decide How They Should Be Paid

		CURRENT			FUTURE			
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg	
Oncology Pract.								
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000			\$4,500,000		
Triage/Respond						\$200,000		
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,700	1000	\$4,700,000	4%	
		-						
Hospitalizations								
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500			\$3,412,500	0%	
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000		245	\$1,102,500	30%	
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500			\$273,000	-4%	
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000	\$4,788	1000	\$4,788,000	%	
Total Spending	\$9,750	1000	\$9,750,000	\$9,488		\$9,488,000	-3%	

Condition-Based Payment Provides Flexibility to Redesign Care & Pmt

		CURRENT			CONDITION-BASED PMT			
	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	Chg	
Oncology Pract.								
E&M/Infusions	\$4,500	1000	\$4,500,000			\$4,500,000		
Triage/Respond						\$200,000		
Total Practice		1000	\$4,500,000	\$4,700	1000	\$4,700,000	4%	
Hospitalizations								
Fixed (65%)	\$9,750		\$3,412,500			\$3,412,500	0%	
Variable (30%)	\$4,500		\$1,575,000		245	\$1,102,500	30%	
Margin (5%)	\$750		\$262,500			\$273,000	-4%	
Total Hospital	\$15,000	350	\$5,250,000	\$4,788	1000	\$4,788,000	%	
Total Spending	\$9,750	1000	\$9,750,000	\$9,488		\$9,488,000	-3%	



Protections For Providers Against Taking Inappropriate Risk

- Risk Adjustment/Stratification: The payment rates to the provider would be adjusted based on objective characteristics of the patient and treatment that would be expected to result in the need for more services or increase the risk of complications.
- Outlier Payment or Individual Stop Loss Insurance: The payment to the Physician from the payer would be increased if spending on an individual patient exceeds a pre-defined threshold. An alternative would be for the physician to purchase individual stop loss insurance (sometimes referred to as reinsurance) and include the cost of the insurance in the payment bundle.
- Risk Corridors or Aggregate Stop Loss Insurance: The payment to the physician would be increased if spending on all patients exceeds a pre-defined percentage above the payments. An alternative would be for the physician to purchase aggregate stop loss insurance and include the cost of the insurance in the payment bundle.
- Adjustment for External Price Changes: The payment to the physician would be adjusted for changes in the prices of drugs or services from other physicians that are beyond the control of the physician accepting the payment.
- **Excluded Services:** Services the physician does not deliver, or order, or otherwise have the ability to influence would not be included as part of accountability measures in the payment system.



Example of Risk-Stratified Condition-Based Payment

	LOWER RISK PATIENTS	HIGHER RISK PATIENTS	
	# Pts	# Pts	
Oncology Pract.			
Total Practice	500	500	1000
Hospitalizations	300	300	1000
Total Hospital	62	183	245
	500	500	1000
Lowe of Hos	er-Risk (12%) pital Admission	Higher-Risk (37%) of Hospital Admission	



Example of Risk-Stratified Condition-Based Payment

		LOWER RISK PATIENTS		HIGHER RISK PATIENTS				
		\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	TOTAL
	Oncology Pract.							
	E&M/Infusion	\$4,500	500	\$2,250,000	\$4,500	500	\$2,250,000	\$4,500,000
	Triage/Intervene	\$100	500	\$50,000	\$300	500	\$150,000	\$200,000
	Total Practice	\$4,600	500	\$2,300,000	\$4,800	500	\$2,400,000	\$4,700,000
ŀ	lospitalizations							
	Fixed			\$853,125			\$2,559,375	\$3,412,500
	Variable	\$4,500		\$279,000	\$4,500		\$823,500	\$1,102,500
	Margin			\$68,250			\$204,750	\$273,000
	Total Hospital	\$2,401	62	\$1,200,375	\$7,175	183	\$3,587,625	\$4,788,000
٦	Total Spending	\$7,001	500	\$3,500,375	\$11,975	500	\$5,987,625	\$9,488,000

Lower Payment For Lower-Risk Patients

Higher Payment For Higher-Risk Patients Still Lower Total Spending